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ABSTRACT 
This objective of this thesis is to explore the potential benefits realized by 
the Marine Corps if the current Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) system is 
replaced with an auction mechanism that utilizes Quality Adjusted Discount 
(QUAD) methodology.  The Uniform Price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction is 
designed to reduce the total cost of ACP while simultaneously increasing the 
overall quality of the aviators being retained.  The goal of this study was to 
evaluate the existing ACP system and through experimentation, coupled with 
economical analyses, determine the feasibility of replacing the current system of 
assigning the aviator retention bonus with one that incorporates QUAD 
methodology. 
The QUAD auction mechanism caters to a wide range of individual 
reservation values resulting from various economic conditions.  An ACP auction 
would reflect changing economic conditions, because aviators would reveal their 
true reservation values when bidding.  Although an auction mechanism may not 
always result in a cost savings, it will ensure that the bonus amounts are set at 
the correct levels.  If a QUAD auction were used in lieu of the current ACP 
system, Marine Corps manpower planners would have the flexibility to more cost 
effectively retain higher quality aviators while achieving Marine Corps aviator 
retention goals.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Military manpower planners have long had to contend with airlines in the 
civilian labor market to retain their highly trained pilots and naval flight officers.  
Until 2001, civilian airlines could lure highly desirable military pilots away from the 
military with promises of a better lifestyle, better benefits, a $300,000 salary, and 
a 14-day work month (Maue, 2008). To combat aviator shortages, Congress 
authorized the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program in 1989 as a 
replacement to the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay program (GAO, 1994).  The 
new ACP bonus was intended as a retention incentive to entice military aviators 
in critical aviation specialties to remain on active duty.   
September 11, 2001, however, marked the beginning of the end of the 
mass exodus of military aviators.  Civilian airlines quickly felt the economic effect 
of 9/11 as domestic air travel plummeted.  Although Congress immediately 
passed the Stabilization Act that provided $15 billion in assistance to the airline 
industry, several major airlines were ultimately forced to reduce domestic flights 
and conduct mass layoffs in an unsuccessful attempt to remain profitable 
(Congressional Research Service, 2002).  While airline jobs had become scarce, 
Marine Corps aviators were still able to sign new ACP contracts with annual 
bonus payments as high as $25,000 per year (U.S. Marine Corps, 2002).  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the viability of using an 
auction mechanism for assigning aviator retention bonuses.  More specifically, 
this study will examine the feasibility of using the Quality Adjusted Discount 
(QUAD) auction to assign Aviation Continuation Pay. The goal is to evaluate the 
existing system and through simulation, coupled with economical analyses, 
determine the feasibility of replacing the current system of assigning the aviation 
retention bonus with one that incorporates the QUAD methodology.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
The primary research question in this thesis is to explore the Marine 
Corps’ potential cost savings by replacing the current Aviation Continuation Pay 
(ACP) system with an auction mechanism that utilizes the Quality Adjusted 
Discount (QUAD) methodology.  Additionally, this thesis will investigate the 
degree to which the QUAD methodology can effectively increase the quality of 
marine aviators who receive ACP and are subsequently retained by the Marine 
Corps.   
2. Secondary Question 
A secondary question to be explored is how changing economic 
conditions, and the resulting changes in the civilian labor market, should affect 
ACP bonus amounts.   
D. THESIS SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study focuses on Marine Corps aviators who are eligible to receive 
aviation continuation pay.  The thesis includes: (1) an analysis of the monetary 
compensation of both military and civilian pilots, (2) a review of auction theory 
and its practical applications, (3) an overview of the Quality Adjusted Discount 
(QUAD) model and its applicability in assigning Aviation Continuation Pay, and 
(4) a recommendation for cost-effectively assigning ACP.  
 
 3
II. MONETARY COMPENSATION OVERVIEW 
A. MILITARY COMPENSATION 
1. Basic Pay 
Pay and allowances for uniformed service members are prescribed under 
Title 37 of the United States Code. Service members receive basic pay at a 
monthly rate that is based on their military rank and years of service.  As the 
name implies, basic pay does not include any special pays and allowances to 
which a service member may also be entitled.  Each year, uniform service 
members receive an increase in monthly basic pay that equals the percentage by 
which the Employment Cost Index increases from the previous year (U.S. 
Congress, 2002).   
2. Monetary Incentives 
To remain competitive with the civilian labor market, the military services 
provide monetary incentives, in addition to basic pay, to attract and retain service 
members in specific undermanned military occupational specialties (MOSs).  For 
example, a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is offered to enlisted members 
who hold a critical MOS and agree to reenlist in that MOS for at least four years.   
While Congress determines the maximum SRB the service Secretaries can pay, 
actual SRB bonuses for a given MOS are determined by the respective 
manpower planners based on anticipated personnel shortages.  As a result, 
while marines possessing certain MOS/pay grade combinations were not eligible 
to receive a bonus during FY09, others qualified for bonuses as high as 
$90,000—the SRB payment cap mandated by Congress (U.S. Marine Corps, 
2008).  Once retention requirements are met, HQMC publishes a message 
notifying leaders that selective reenlistment bonuses for each respective 
reenlistment zone have been suspended.  While marines may still reenlist, they 
will not be eligible to receive the SRB.  
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B. MARINE CORPS AVIATION PAY AND INCENTIVES 
1. Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
In the officer ranks, Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) is a monthly 
incentive paid to regular and reserve officers “who hold, or are in training leading 
to, an aeronautical rating or designation and who engage and remain in aviation 
service on a career basis” (U.S. Congress, 2002).  ACIP is paid in addition to 
basic pay and allowances.  Set forth by Congress, ACIP amounts are determined 
by an aviator’s years of aviation service and range from $125 per month, for 
aviators with less than two years of aviation service, to $840 per month, for those 
with between 14 and 22 years of aviation service.  After 22 years, ACIP 
payments begin to notably decrease.  According to Title 37 U.S.C., aviators are 
entitled to continuous monthly ACIP payments through their twelfth and 
eighteenth years respectively, provided they “perform the prescribed operational 
flying duties (including flight training but excluding proficiency flying) for eight of 
the first 12, and 12 of the first 18 years of the aviation service of the officer.”    
2. Aviation Continuation Pay 
In addition to Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), Aviation Continuation 
Pay (ACP) is a retention bonus paid to aviators.  As explained in Marine Corps 
Bulletin (MCBUL) 7220, the intent of the program is to provide a proactive, long-
term aviation career incentive for marine aviation officers (U.S. Marine Corps, 
2008).  The ACP bonus targets officers in critical aviation MOSs who are within 
one year of completing their initial aviation service obligation.  These officers 
usually have between eight and eleven Years of Commissioned Service (YCS) 
and must decide whether to remain on active duty or separate from the military 
and enter the civilian labor market.  By this point in an aviator’s career, they have 
typically accumulated over one thousand flight-hours and gained a wealth of 
experience, desirable qualities by both military and civilian standards.  As a 
result, the military must often compete with airlines in the civilian labor market to 
retain its highly trained pilots and naval flight officers. 
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There are two ACP bonus options based on an aviator’s Years of 
Commissioned Service (YCS).   According to MCBUL 7220 for FY09, a short-
term contract is available to officers who have 24 months or more remaining to 
complete 13 YCS; additionally, a long-term contract is available to captains and 
majors who have at least 36 months or more remaining to complete 16 YCS 
(U.S. Marine Corps, 2008).  Thus, the contract length is equal to the number of 
months an officer has to complete an obligated 13 or 16 YCS, respectively.  Title 
37 states, “The amount of a retention bonus paid under this section may not be 
more than $25,000 for each year covered by the written agreement to remain on 
active duty.”  Similar to the SRB paid to enlisted marines, ACP levels are 
assessed annually based on anticipated aviator shortages.  Table 1 summarizes 
FY09 payment provisions for both short and long-term ACP contracts as outlined 
in MCBUL7220. 
Table 1.   FY09 ACP Payment Provisions. 
 
FY09 ACP payment provisions as outlined in MCBUL7220. 
 
Approximately 400 aviators become eligible for the ACP bonus each year, 
but the target number the Marine Corps must retain to fill critical aviation billets is 
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determined by manpower planners based on projected endstrength 
requirements.  Typically, the target retention goal is around 200 out of the nearly 
400 eligible officers.  ACP bonuses are based on historical levels and the 
accompanying number of aviators who retained at a particular bonus level.  The 
historical bonus amount is then increased or deceased based on current aviator 
demand (Davidson, 2009). 
Although an aviator must be recommended by their commanding officer, 
ACP is essentially granted to all aviators who apply as long as they meet the 
requirements set forth in MCBUL 7220.  The quality of aviators being retained is 
seldom considered, nor is there consideration for the economic rent paid to 
aviators with lower opportunity costs who would have retained even without the 
ACP bonus.  Unlike the SRB program, the ACP bonus remains available to 
eligible aviators long after the Marine Corps has achieved its aviator retention 
goals.  As a result, the Marine Corps retained 162 percent of the targeted aviator 
population in FY09.  An auction mechanism could identify the level of ACP 
required to yield the desired endstrength requirements.  Accordingly, the Marine 
Corps could significantly reduce the excess economic rent paid to aviators with 
lower opportunity costs of remaining on active duty; this could potentially save 
the Marine Corps millions of dollars each year in recaptured economic surplus.  
Figure 1 is an example of the economic rent paid by the Marine Corps in FY09. 
 
Figure 1.   Economic Rent from Excessive ACP 
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C. CIVILIAN AVIATION 
1. Wages and Benefits 
Civilian airline pilots have historically earned some of the highest wages in 
the nation.  While the median annual salary in the United States was $32,000 in 
2008, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that airline pilots, copilots, and flight 
engineers earned salaries ranging from $55,000 to $150,000, with a median 
annual salary of  $111,680.  Additionally, commercial pilot earnings ranged from 
$32,000 to $130,000, with a median annual salary of $65,340 (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2009).  Salaries on the higher end of the spectrum are paid to the most 
senior pilots; lower salaries are paid to commuter pilots and those with the least 
seniority.  In addition to higher than average annual wages, civilian pilots are also 
afforded benefits including expense allowances, per diem, and free airline travel 
for the pilot and their immediate family.  Although civilian pilots earn higher than 
average annual wages, the annual basic pay, benefits, and incentives paid to 
military aviators can be quite comparable.  Figure 2 compares the estimated 








Note: Average BAH is an annual amount based on 2009 BAH rates for North Carolina and 
California based aviators.  Average ACP represents an annual amount for an aviator on a long-
term ACP contract during FY09. 
Figure 2.   Military and civilian pilot pay comparison.  
2. Economic Conditions 
Pilot employment is sensitive to cyclical swings in the economy. During 
recessions, when the demand for air travel decreases, airlines are often forced to 
ground planes, reduce the number of flights, and even lay off some pilots (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2009).  According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, December 2007 marked the start of the current economic recession 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009).  In the 23 months spanning from 
December 2007 through October 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports 
that nearly 50,000 mass layoffs had occurred, leading to over 5,000,000 layoffs 
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in the United States; meanwhile, the national unemployment rate climbed from 
4.9 to 10.2 percent (U.S. Department of Labor, 2009).  As fuel costs reached 
record levels, United Airlines became the first major airline to slash cockpit jobs.  
To further reduce operating costs, United Airlines laid off 950 of its 6500 pilots 
(The New York Times, 2008).  U.S. Airways would soon follow, laying off over 
300 of its 5000 pilots (U.S. Airways Group, 2009).    
Although layoffs have plagued the civilian labor market since the current 
recession began in 2007, uniform service members have enjoyed a relatively 
secure employment outlook.  In fact, the Army and the Marine Corps increased 
their total end-strength during the economic downturn.  In 2007, the President 
approved a combined increase of 92,000 active duty personnel for the two 
services: the Army gained 65,000 additional soldiers, while the Marine Corps 
increased its ranks by 27,000 (Department of Defense, 2007).  Subsequently in 
2009, the U.S. Senate granted the Army permission to temporarily increase its 
ranks by as many 30,000 additional soldiers.  In total, the personnel gains 
represent end-strength increases of nearly 20 percent for the Army and 15 
percent for the Marine Corps.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines the compensation and benefits of military and civilian 
aviators and compares the estimated pay of the two.  The chapter also discusses 
economic conditions and the effect the current recession has had on both the 
military and civilian labor markets.  At a time when civilian unemployment 
exceeded 10 percent, the Army and Marine Corps increased total endstrength by 
122,000 personnel.  Moreover, while two major airlines furloughed 1250 total 
pilots, the Marine Corps retained 127 aviators beyond its FY09 retention target of 
203 aviators.  As each ACP eligible aviator received an average ACP bonus of 
$16,000 in FY09, the total cost to the Marine Corps is over five million dollars per 
year; two million dollars beyond the amount required to achieve the FY09 
retention goal.  An auction mechanism that utilizes the QUAD methodology could 
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potentially save the Marine Corps millions of dollars each year by enabling 
manpower planners to (1) achieve the target number of aviators, (2) reduce the 
economic rent paid to aviators, and (3) increase the overall quality of aviators 
retained by the Marine Corps. 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO AUCTION THEORY 
A. BACKGROUND 
 An auction is defined as a market institution with an explicit set of rules 
determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market 
participants (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  The earliest recorded auctions are 
believed to have occurred in Babylon around 500 B.C.  During that time, “women 
of marriageable age were sold annually to buyers on condition that they be wed.  
Competitive bidding established premium prices for the more attractive maidens 
and lower prices for the less attractive ones” (Cassady, 1968).  Today, auctions 
are still a popular way to negotiate prices for goods and services that may not 
have a standard value or whose value fluctuates with current supply and demand 
conditions (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  Such items include, but are not limited to, 
antiques, artwork, livestock, U.S. Treasury bills, and manufacturers vying for 
government contracts.  
B. VOCABULARY OF AUCTIONS 
To facilitate ease of reading, this section briefly summarizes the auction 
terminology most frequently used within this study.  The following section 
consists of a compilation of theses conducted at The Naval Postgraduate School.  
All information is used courtesy of the following Thesis authors:  William N. Filip, 
Paul B. Bock, and Tony K. Verenna.    
Although auctions can vary significantly based on location, rules, or 
format, there are certain terms that are constant throughout any auction.  For 
instance, in any auction there are bidders and bid-takers.  Bidders are the 
persons or entities competing against each other for the winning price.  The bid-
takers are those who receive the price offers proposed by the bidders.  On the 
other hand, there are sellers and buyers.  A seller is one who has a good or 
service that he or she is willing to provide at the right price.  The buyer, however, 
is the one looking to purchase the good or service from the seller.        
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The most commonly recognized auction is one with a single seller of a 
good and multiple buyers competing for the right to buy the good.  This is called 
a forward auction, and is often used for selling artwork, furniture, or other 
individual items.  For this type of auction, the winner is the bidder willing to pay 
the seller the highest price for the item.  However, there exists a case with one 
buyer in search of a good or service with multiple sellers vying for the right to 
provide the service.  This type of auction is called a reverse auction, and is 
commonly used by governments for contracting services to build weapon 
systems, erect buildings, and create labor contracts.  In this situation, the winner 
is the bidder willing to sell the good or perform the service at the lowest cost to 
the buyer. 
During an auction, bidders’ valuation of an item is reflected by their 
reservation price.  The Reservation price is the maximum amount a bidding 
buyer is willing to pay for an item in a forward auction, or the minimum amount a 
bidding seller would accept in a reverse auction.  Alternatively, bid-takers often 
use a reserve price to ensure adequate/sufficient rent is exchanged in the 
transaction.  A reserve price is the minimum a bid-taking seller is willing to accept 
for an item in a forward auction, or the maximum a bid-taking buyer is willing to 
pay in a reverse auction.  
For a detailed explanation of auction theory and the various auction types 
and their application, refer to the Appendix. 
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IV. QUALITY ADJUSTED DISCOUNT (QUAD) MODEL 
The QUAD model operates under the principles of a Second-Price Sealed 
Bid Auction in that buyers submit a single, sealed bid and the good is awarded to 
the bidder who submits the highest bid.  The winning bidder then pays a price 
equal not to his own bid, but to the second highest, or first excluded, bid (McAfee 
& McMillan, 1987).  In a Second-Price sealed Bid auction, the dominant strategy 
is for all buyers to bid their true reservation price 
However the QUAD model differs slightly in that it is a reverse auction; 
thus, it consists of a single buyer, buying the services of multiple sellers.  The 
winning sellers are those who submit the lowest bids.  The buyer then pays the 
winning sellers a price equal to the first excluded bid.  As mentioned above, the 
dominant strategy in a Second-Price sealed Bid auction is for all buyers to bid 
their true reservation price. 
A. SELLERS 
Marine aviators represent the sellers; these officers are trying to maximize 
their total income by submitting ACP bids, bi, to the Marine Corps for their 
retention and continued service as an aviator.  The bid amounts represent each 
officer’s reservation value, ri, for remaining on active duty.  All bids are sealed; 
thus, officers are not able to observe their rival’s bids, nor can they adjust their 
own bid, once submitted.  There is no incentive to exaggerate one’s reservation 
price by submitting an inflated bid, because officers will not be retained if their bid 
is rejected.  Additionally, there is no incentive to underbid one’s reservation price 
because you may be retained at an unacceptable price 
B. BUYERS 
Marine Corps Manpower Planners represent the buyer.  The Manpower 
Planners’ objective is to curtail anticipated aviator shortages each year by 
purchasing the continued service of officers in critically short aviation MOSs.  
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Because this is a reverse auction, Manpower Planners will purchase ACP bids 
from officers who are willing to provide their services for the smallest ACP bonus.  
The Marine Corps will also attempt to retain higher quality aviation officers by 
utilizing the QUAD framework outlined below.   
C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The primary difference between the QUAD model and a standard second-
price sealed bid reverse auction is that the QUAD model controls for quality by 
providing a monetary discount to the ACP bids of aviators with higher quality 
ratings.  Officers with a Quality rating of q* or greater will have their bids reduced 
by $A to compensate for their presumably higher reservation value. The bids of 
officers who do not have the desired quality rating will remain unchanged.  
1. Process  
Bidders (military officers in our example) will be characterized by 3 values: 
bi, qi and ri, representing bid, quality and reservation value, respectively.  There 
are total of Ni agents. Agent i’s goal is to maximize his payoff, pi, by submitting 
bid bi. Reservation value, ri, is private information and quality, qi, is public 
information. The buyer’s (manpower planners in our example) objective is to 
retain M many officers.  In an effort to maintain higher quality officers, assume 
the Department of the Navy (DoN) has authorized Manpower Planners to offer an 
assistance of $A for every officer with quality rating above qi*. 
After receiving all ACP bids, USMC Manpower Planners will calculate the 
Quality Adjusted Bid, bi* as follows:  
 
 
Then Manpower Planners rank bi* from lowest to highest and accept the M 
bidders with the lowest quality adjusted bids.  Denote b* as the M+1 lowest bid 
(first excluded bid).  Therefore, officers with a bi* < b* will be retained.  If there is 
a tie, the officer with the highest qi receives the bonus. 
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Everyone who is retained will be paid an ACP bonus as follows: 
 
 
Anyone not retained will receive his or her reservation value of ri from the 
outside offer. 
For example, two officers each submit bi of $10,000; Officer A has the 
required q* quality rating, Officer B does not.  Manpower Planners will provide a 
$2,000 QUAD to the bids of officers with a quality rating greater than or equal to 
q*.  Because Officer A has the desired q* quality rating, his submitted bid would 
be reduced by $2,000; thus, the quality adjusted bid, q*, of Officer A will be 
$8,000.  Conversely, Officer B does not have the desired q* quality rating; the 
quality adjusted bid, q*, of Officer B would be his $10,000 submitted bid.  
D. MODEL CONSTRUCT 
For the QUAD model to operate efficiently, the following guidelines must 
be adhered to: 
 For each aviation MOS, determine the number of aviators needed 
for retention and conduct a reverse second-price, sealed bid, 
auction for ACP contracts.   
 Eligible officers in each qualifying MOS submit a single, sealed bid 
that represents their reservation value for continued service as a 
marine aviator.  
 Because the QUAD model represents a reverse auction, the 
winning bidders will be the officers who submit the lowest bids. 
 Once all bids are received, manpower planners will apply a Quality 
Adjusted Discount (QUAD) of $A to the bids of officers with a 
quality rating of q* or greater.  
 The cutoff amount, or ACP bonus paid to all aviators with a winning 
bid, will be the first excluded bid of each auction (i.e. the lowest 
losing bid).  
 Officers who submit a winning bid, and whose quality rating is equal 
to q*, will receive an ACP bonus equal to the cutoff amount, plus 
the amount of their respective QUAD.   
 16
 Participation in the QUAD auction represents a binding ACP 
contract for all officers who submit winning bids. 
 The Marine Corps will not retain officers whose bids are rejected.   
E. KEY POINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to estimate the Marine Corps’ potential cost savings and quality 
gains by replacing the current ACP system with one that utilizes the QUAD 
model, the following assumption were applied to the analysis:   
 Because over 95 percent of aviators opted for the long-term ACP 
contract in FY09, this study will not distinction between short-term 
and term and long-term ACP contracts.   
 Aviation officers receive a quality rating from their commanding 
officer when applying for ACP.  Quality ratings range from one to 
five, with five being the highest.    
 There is also the assumption that there is a strong, positive 
correlation between quality and reservation value; thus, higher 
quality officers will generally have higher reservation values, 
resulting in higher ACP bids.  
F. BIDDING STRATEGY 
Because officers are not retained if their bid is rejected, truthfully revealing 
one’s reservation value is the optimal bidding strategy.  An officer’s bid should 
accurately reflect their reservation value for remaining on active duty.  Take, for 
example, an employee who is trying to decide whether to work for Company A or 
Company B.  Both companies are identical in every way and the employee has 
no preference for either company.  Company B has offered the employee a 
guaranteed salary of $100,000; thus, the employee’s reservation value for 
working for the Company A is $100,000.  The employee’s bid should reflect this 
reservation value in salary talks with Company A.   
By truthfully bidding one’s reservation value, the employee is able to 
maximize their income potential.  Thus, the bidder will always receive an amount 
greater than, or equal to, his or her true reservation value.  Table 2 illustrates the 
expected outcomes that result from utilizing the three possible bidding strategies:  
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1) Overbidding, 2) Underbidding, and 3) Truthfully bidding one’s reservation 
value.  Highlighted in green in the table below is an illustration of how truthful 
revelation of one’s opportunity cost ensures that the bidder will always receive an 
amount greater than or equal to their reservation value during salary 
negotiations.  Thus, the bidder will never lose money by bidding their true 
reservation value. 
Table 2.   Optimal bidding strategy when an outside offer exists. 
 
Highlighted in green, the optimal bidding strategy is truthful revelation of one’s opportunity costs. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
To analyze the QUAD model’s cost effectiveness in assigning ACP, the 
design characteristics and assumptions set forth in the previous section have 
been entered into a standard Excel spreadsheet.  The QUAD model will be 
analyzed under varying conditions and the results compared to FY09 ACP 
payment provisions.  The goal is to identify potential cost savings and quality 
gains for the Marine Corps if the current system is replaced with an auction 
mechanism that utilizes the QUAD model.   
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Estimating the potential cost savings and quality gains attainable by 
implementing an auction mechanism that utilizes the QUAD methodology 
requires making certain assumptions, to include the following:   
 For a given MOS, the model will assume that 25 officers become 
eligible and agree to participate in the ACP auction each year. 
 The Marine Corps will only retain 15 out of the 25 eligible officers 
from each MOS.  This ratio approximates the target retention goal 
from FY09.  Additionally, repeated trials have revealed that this 
ratio slightly underestimates the potential cost savings and quality 
gains associated with the QUAD model. 
 Auction bids are randomly computer generated and range between 
$5,000 and $20,000.  This range is commensurate with the range 
of ACP bonuses offered in FY09. 
 Reservation value and quality are highly correlated.  Thus, higher 
quality officers will have higher reservation values (bids). 
 A standard contract for the model will be six years in length to 
resemble the average duration of a long-term ACP contract for a 
marine aviator.  
C. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
The model will be analyzed using randomly generated data based on 
FY09 ACP payment provisions.  The cost of retaining a select number of officers 
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from a given aviation MOS under the current ACP system will be used as the 
baseline.  This information will be compared to the cost of retaining the same 
number of officers using a standard second price auction.  Then, both sets of 
results will be compared to the cost of retaining the same officers using the 
QUAD model.   
1. Evaluation Measures 
The primary measures used to evaluate the effectiveness of the QUAD 
model will be Average Aviator Quality and Total ACP Paid.  As previously stated, 
the goal of the model is to increase the overall quality of retained aviators while 
reducing the total ACP paid.  The variables used to achieve the measures of 
effectiveness have been labeled as follows: 
a. Reservation Value (Bid) 
The minimum amount of money an officer will accept to remain on 
active duty.  This amount represents each officer’s opportunity cost. 
b. Quality Rating 
A one to five rating given to all aviators upon applying for ACP. 
c. q* 
The predetermined minimum quality rating an officer must possess 
to quality for the Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD). 
d. QUAD Bid 
A Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) will be subtracted from the 
submitted (reservation value) bid of officers with a q* or higher quality rating.  The 
QUAD bid is an officer’s adjusted bid after the quality discount has been applied. 
e. $A 
The monetary allowance allocated to discount the Reservation 
Value (Bid) of higher quality officers. 
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f. Rank 
Each bidders position in their respective bidding cohort. 
g. Retained 
A binomial variable indicating whether or not an officer’s bid has 
been accepted and the officer retained. 
h. Bonus Received 
The amount paid to officers who submit winning bids.  Generally, 
the Bonus Received is equal to the first excluded auction bid.  However, officers 
with a q*, or above, quality rating receive a bonus equal to the first excluded bid 
plus the allowance allotted for the quality discount.  
i. Target 
The target retention goal for a given auction. 
j. Uniform Price 
The cutoff price (first excluded bid) for the auction.  The term 
Uniform Price Auction will be used to denote a second-price auction with a single 
buyer (the Marine Corps) and multiple sellers (aviation officers). 
D. STANDARD UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION 
In FY09, the average long-term ACP bonus was $16,000 (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2008).  For that reason, $16,000 will be used as the baseline in 
calculating the potential savings associated with replacing the current system 
with an auction mechanism.  Additionally, the following example will assume the 
goal is to retain 15 out of 25 officers from a given MOS.  Based on these 
assumptions, the cost of retaining 15 aviators in FY09 would be $240,000 
annually.  Assuming a six-year ACP contract, it would cost the Marine Corps 
$1,440,000 to retain the 15 aviators, regardless of aviator quality or whether 
some aviators could have been retained for less money.  
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Conversely, the Marine Corps could attain the same retention goal using a 
uniform price auction. With a uniform price auction, the Marine Corps would grant 
ACP contracts to the 15 officers with the lowest opportunity costs for remaining 
on active duty as indicated by their auction bid.  The 15 officers who submit 
winning bids are paid a uniform bonus equal to the first excluded (sixteenth) 
auction bid. Officers with higher reservation values would not be retained.  Table 
3 is an example of a uniform price auction being used to retain 15 aviators. 
Table 3.   Example of a Uniform Price Auction for a given aviation MOS. 
 
 
Randomly generated reservation values ranging from $5,000 - $20,000 are used to denote the 
range of ACP contracts in FY09.  This first excluded bid ($15,517) is the ACP bonus paid to all 
aviators. 
 23
1. Total ACP Paid 
Based on the example above, using a second price auction to allocate 
ACP yields a substantial cost savings when compared to the current system of 
assigning ACP.  The first excluded bid, and subsequent ACP paid to all 15 
aviators with winning bids, is $11,517, far less than the $16,000 average ACP 
paid in FY09.   
Based a potential cost savings of $4,483 per aviator, the total cost to 
retain the 330 aviators retained in FY09 could have been reduced by 28 percent.  
Table 4 depicts the potential cost savings associated with using a uniform price 
auction to assign ACP both annually and for the duration of an ACP contract 
during FY09.  
Table 4.   Potential ACP cost savings using a Uniform Price Auction. 
 
2. Average Aviator Quality 
Although quality would not normally be considered in a standard second 
price auction, it is included in Table 3 to illustrate one of the primary assumptions 
that aviator quality and reservation value are highly positively correlated.  As 
indicated in table above, aviators with higher quality ratings are assumed to have 
higher reservation values of remaining on active duty; this is indicated by their 
higher auction bids.  Based on this assumption, a standard second price auction 




their associated lower reservation values.  However, the benefit of retaining 
aviators with potentially lower average quality ratings lies in the associated cost 
savings.   
E. UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION UTILIZING QUAD METHODOLOGY 
Operating under the same principles and assumptions previously outlined, 
the thesis will now compare the potential gains of a standard uniform price 
auction to the potential gains associated with an auction mechanism that utilizes 
a Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD).  The uniform price Quality Adjusted 
Discount (QUAD) Auction provides a monetary allowance of $A to the bids of all 
officers with quality ratings greater than or equal to q*.  For the following 
example, $A will equate to 3,000 and officers must possess a q* rating of at least 
four to qualify for the allowance.  
The model can potentially reduce total ACP costs, while simultaneously 
increasing the average overall quality of retained aviators.  The total cost of ACP 
is reduced primarily because the QUAD reduces the value of the first excluded 
bid, and hence the bonus payment, to all but the highest quality aviators.  To 
accomplish this, it is important that officers participating in the auction bid their 
true opportunity cost to remain on active duty.  A uniform price auction 
accomplishes this in part because officers whose bids are rejected are not 
retained.   
The QUAD model increases average aviator quality by discounting the 
bids of higher quality officers who would have been separated by a standard 
second price auction because of their higher opportunity costs.  Under the 
QUAD, these higher quality aviators receive higher ACP bonuses than the 
uniform price paid to other aviators in exchange for their continued military 
service.  
Table 5 provides an example of a uniform price QUAD Auction that 
incorporates a QUAD equal to $3,000 for quality ratings four and five.  As 
illustrated in Table 5, the ACP decreases from $11,517 in the previous example 
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to $10,396 for 12 of the 15 aviators retained; it increases to $13,396 for just the 
three quality 4 aviators retained in this example. 




































1. Cost Savings and Quality Gains When $A = 3,000 
Compared to a standard uniform price auction shown in Table 3, the 
uniform price QUAD Auction has consistently proven to increase the average 
quality of the retained aviators.  As the value of $A increases, aviator quality 
increases accordingly.  For example, the average quality of the retained aviators 
in the standard uniform price auction is 2.47.  However in a uniform price QUAD 
Auction, when a QUAD of $3,000 is applied to the ACP bids of officers with a q* 
rating of four and above, average aviator quality increases from 2.47 to 2.60.   
Additionally, the uniform price QUAD Auction can significantly reduce total 
ACP costs compared to a standard uniform price auction.  However, actual cost 
savings from the uniform price QUAD Auction vary depending on several factors: 
1) the number of bidders, 2) the actual bid amounts, and 3) the value of $A being 
offered.  For example, the uniform price QUAD Auction produced an ACP 
savings of $7,815, in addition to aviator quality gains, when $A equaled 3,000.  
Table 6 provides a sample comparison of the quality gains and cost savings 
resulting from using a uniform price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction with a 
QUAD of $3,000. 
Table 6.   Quality gains and cost savings from the Uniform Price QUAD Auction 
when $A = 3,000 
 
2. Cost Savings and Quality Gains When $A = 5,500 
Incrementally increasing the value of $A would increase the average 
quality of the officers retained as the reservation values (bids) of additional higher 
quality officers are discounted below the auction’s cutoff bid.  For example, 
increasing the QUAD from $3,000 to $5,500 increases average aviator quality 
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from 2.60 to 2.73 by retaining two additional higher quality aviators.  As the 
QUAD allowance increases, the QUAD model retains increasingly more higher 
quality officers than under the standard uniform price auction.   
Offering $A in various amounts ranging from 1,000 to 5500 yielded 
considerable cost savings during numerous trials.  After a point, cost savings 
decrease with increases in $A.  However, the decreased savings associated with 
increasing $A were offset by higher average aviator quality ratings.  Thus, when 
$A increased to 5,500, greater aviator quality gains were accompanied by a 
corresponding ACP savings of $4,855 compared to a standard uniform price 
auction.  Table 7 summarizes the quality gains and cost savings resulting from a 
uniform price QUAD Auction that incorporates a QUAD of $5,500.  
Table 7.   Quality gains and cost savings from the Uniform Price QUAD Auction 
when $A = 5,500 
 
3. Increasing the Target Retention Goal 
The size of the target retention goal significantly affects the level of 
potential savings captured using the uniform price Quality Adjusted Discount 
auction.  Increasing the retention target from 15 to 20 aviators produces 
considerable savings in total ACP costs.  Such may be the case in aviation 
MOSs with historically high turnover rates and during times of economic 
prosperity in the civilian labor market.  Although quality gains in this instance are 
less than those previously discussed, they are nonetheless apparent.  As 
retention rates increase, average aviator quality increases with the standard 
uniform price auction, and there is less room for improvement.  Holding all things 
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equal, Table 8 illustrates the cost savings and corresponding quality gains 
resulting from increasing the retention target from 15 officers to 20 officers. 
Table 8.   Target Retention Goal = 20/25.  $A = 5,500 
 
a. Diminishing Returns to Aviator Quality 
As the value of $A gradually increases, the QUAD model eventually 
reaches the point of diminishing returns to aviator quality, while ACP costs 
continued to amass exponentially.  Based on the example, offering $A in 
amounts beyond 5,500 failed to provide a cost savings.  In fact, 12,000 proved to 
be the level of $A at which additional increases in $A no longer yields 
accompanying increases in aviator quality.  While average aviator quality 
reached a peak of 3.33 at that level, the total ACP cost rose to $229,575, an 
increase of 75 percent over the standard uniform price auction.  
F. APPLICATION TO THE MARINE CORPS 
In FY09, approximately 385 aviation officers were eligible to apply for 
ACP.  Of the 385 eligible officers, the Marine Corps had a target retention goal of 
203 total aviation officers from all MOSs.  To effectively apply the QUAD model 
to a Marine Corps specific example, a uniform price QUAD Auction was 
conducted using the aforementioned population and retention parameters.  
Under the same basic principles and assumptions previously detailed, the model 
will estimate the potential gains to the Marine Corps if the current ACP system 
were to be replaced with an auction mechanism that utilizes a Quality Adjusted 
Discount (QUAD).  For the following example, $A will equal 3,000 and officers 
must possess a minimum q* rating of four to qualify for the QUAD.   
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1. Cost Savings and Quality Gains When $A = 3,000 
Consistent with the previous examples, the uniform price QUAD Auction 
proves superior to the standard uniform price auction for increasing average 
aviator quality.  The ensuing quality gains stem from meeting or exceeding the 
higher reservation values of the presumably higher quality officers involved.  
Thus, a $3,000 QUAD led to an increase in average aviator quality of 0.19 points.  
The increase in aviator quality is accompanied by a corresponding increase in 
ACP savings of $109,458 compared to a standard uniform price auction. Based 
on 385 randomly generated ACP bids with corresponding quality ratings, and a 
retention target of 203 aviators, Table 9 summarizes the cost savings and quality 
gains from a uniform price QUAD Auction with a QUAD of $3,000 to those of a 
standard uniform price auction for assigning ACP.  
Table 9.   Target Retention Goal = 203/385.  $A = 3,000 
 
2. Cost Savings and Quality Gains When $A = 5,000 
Predictably, increasing the QUAD increases average aviator quality.  
Using a $5,000 QUAD increases average aviator quality to 2.79.  Depicted in 
Table 10, the greater aviator quality gains were accompanied by a corresponding 
ACP savings of $29,504 compared to a standard uniform price auction. 
Table 10.   Target Retention Goal = 203/385.  $A = 5000 
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3. Cost Savings and Quality Gains When $A = 6,000 
As the level of $A approaches the point of diminishing returns to aviator 
quality, further increasing the QUAD to $6,000 increases average aviator quality 
to 2.91.  Although slightly more costly than a standard uniform price auction, the 
uniform price QUAD Auction results in a total quality increase of 0.49 as depicted 
in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Target Retention Goal = 203/385.  $A = 6,000 
 
Table 10 illustrated that applying a $5,000 QUAD to the current aggregate 
ACP example provides a modest $29,504 in cost savings.  Conversely, Table 11 
showed that further increasing the QUAD to $6,000 increases ACP costs 
compared to the standard uniform price auction.  However, the cost to retain the 
same 203 aviators based on FY09 ACP rates would equal approximately 
$3,248,000.  This FY09 figure is estimated by multiplying the average ACP 
contract in FY09 ($16,000) by the target number of aviators (203).  Thus, 
comparing the uniform price QUAD to the standard uniform price auction can be 
misleading.  The standard uniform price auction captures only one primary 
benefit of the QUAD auction, determining the precise ACP bonus to meets the 
Marine Corps’ specific retention target.  What appears to be a net loss for the 
QUAD auction is essentially a cost savings of over $413,000 per year for the 
Marine Corps compared to the current, imprecise method for setting ACP 
bonuses.  Figure 3 summarizes the average total costs and corresponding 




Figure 3.   ACP comparison using N=385, a Target of 203 aviators and $A = 
6000. 
G. SUMMARY 
This section focused on the effectiveness of the model in a static 
environment.  Although the target retention goal and the value of $A were varied 
for comparison purposes, the randomly generated bids and the value of q* 
remained largely unchanged.  Nonetheless, the QUAD model proved capable of 
fulfilling its predicted purpose of reducing total ACP costs while increasing the 
average overall quality of the retained aviators.  Depending on the value of $A, 
the target retention goal, and the actual auction bids, the QUAD model increases 
aviator quality and may or may not reduce costs depending on the size of the 
quality discount.  The modest costs savings and quality gains revealed thus far 
are promising indicators of the overall potential of the QUAD model under more 
intense analysis.    
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VI. SIMULATION AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
This section uses Monte Carlo simulation to analyze 200 bidding rounds 
based on Marine Corps retention goals from FY09.  Certain decision variables 
are randomly generated.  The resulting descriptive statistics can illustrate the 
QUAD model’s effectiveness under the ever-changing and uncertain conditions 
typically characterizing ACP decisions.   
A. SIMULATION CONSTRUCT 
The simulation will operate under the procedures and assumptions 
previously listed.  However, the following guidelines must be introduced for the 
QUAD simulation to operate efficiently: 
 The simulation is structured upon N=385 reservation values (bids).  
This number represents the number of officers eligible to apply for 
ACP in FY09. 
 The target retention goal is 203 officers, representative of the FY09 
retention goal, throughout the simulation.   
 The model will be used to conduct a total of 200 simulated auction 
rounds in order to gather sufficient data for descriptive statistics. 
 All reservation values are randomly generated via computer and 
range from 10,000 to 20,000.  This range represents the range of 
long-term ACP contracts distributed in FY09.  Reservation values 
will vary for each simulated round. 
 The value of $A will be randomly generated and range from 3,000 
to 5,000. This range is consistent with the range used in static 
model trials.  The value of $A will vary for each simulated round.  
 The value of q* will range from three to five and vary for each 
round.   
 The simulation results provide descriptive statistics to analyze the 
potential savings associated with using the QUAD to assign ACP.  
The results will be compared to both a standard uniform price 
auction and the current ACP system.  
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1. Simulation Evaluation Measures 
The descriptive statistics used to evaluate the simulation results are 
Average Aviator Quality, Total ACP Paid, and Correlation.  The evaluation 
measures and the descriptive statistics will be generated following the 200 
simulated bidding rounds.  The results will compare the current ACP system to 
both a standard uniform price auction and to the uniform price Quality Adjusted 
Discount (QUAD) Auction.  The descriptive statistics are defined as follows:  
a. Total ACP Paid—QUAD Model 
The total ACP paid using a uniform price QUAD Auction. 
b. Total ACP Paid—Standard Uniform Price Auction 
The total ACP paid using a standard uniform price auction.    
c. Average Quality—QUAD Model 
The average quality of aviators retained using the QUAD model.  
Average quality using the QUAD model should always be greater than or equal 
to the average quality using a standard uniform price auction. 
d. Average Quality—Standard Uniform Price Auction 
The average quality of aviators retained using a standard uniform 
price auction. 
e. Correlation 
Correlation is the degree to which reservation value and aviator 
quality are interrelated.  Correlations can range from being perfectly uncorrelated 
(-1.0) to perfectly correlated (+1.0).  A correlation of zero indicates that there is 
no relationship between the variables in question.  
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B. SIMULATION RESULTS 
1. Static Quality Discount and Quality Level Variables 
In FY09, 385 marine aviators were eligible for ACP, while the Marine 
Corps had a retention goal of 203 aviators.  Assuming an average ACP contract 
of $16,000, the Marine Corps would have paid approximately $3,248,000 million 
that year to meet the retention goal.  Consequently, the economic downturn of 
FY09 produced an unparalleled surge in retention as 330 officers applied for 
ACP.  This in turn cost the Marine Corps $5,260,000 in FY09. 
Based on 200 simulated bidding rounds, the model will compare the 
potential cost savings and quality gains associated with using the QUAD model 
to retain 203 aviation officers in FY09.  For this simulation, $A = 5,000 and the 
required quality to receive the QUAD is held constant at q* = 4.   
An important feature of the uniform price QUAD Auction is that quality will 
never decrease using this mechanism.  In each of the 200 simulated bidding 
rounds, average aviator quality was greater than or equal to the average aviator 
quality attained using the standard uniform price auction.  Of particular interest, 
Aviator Quality and Reservation Value maintained an average correlation of 0.71 
with a standard deviation of 0.02.  Additionally, the aviator quality increase 
resulting from the QUAD auction, as compared to the standard uniform price 
auction, proved significant at the 5% level.  Figure 4 illustrates the average 










The increase in average aviator quality achieved using the QUAD Auction tested significant at the 
5% level. 
Figure 4.   Average annual ACP cost and average aviator quality comparison 
when $A = 5,000 and q* = 4. 
2. Random Quality Discount and Quality Level Variables 
The final ACP comparison will create an ever-changing and uncertain 
environment in which the independent variables are randomly generated in each 
of the 200 rounds.  For this analysis, the value of $A varies from 3,000 to 5,000 
and the level of q* required for the QUAD varies from three to five.  Although the 
independent variables were randomly generated for this simulation, the 
estimated cost savings and quality increases are nonetheless similar to those 
achieved holding $A and q* constant.  Figure 5 illustrates the quality comparison 
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resulting from the simulation with randomly generated independent variables 
estimated annual costs and the quality increases by achieving the FY09 retention 
goal of 203 officers when all independent variable are randomly generated.  
Because quality will never decrease using QUAD methodology, average 
aviator quality increases in a manner similar to that achieved with $A and q* held 
constant.  Similar to the previous comparison, Aviator Quality and Reservation 
Values were correlated at 0.72 with a standard deviation of 0.02.  Again, the 
resulting increase in aviator quality proved significant at the 5% level.  Figure 5 
illustrates the average annual ACP costs, and corresponding aviator quality, 
resulting from the Monte Carlo simulation.    
 
The increase in average aviator quality achieved using the QUAD Auction tested significant at the 
5% level. 
Figure 5.   Average annual ACP cost and average aviator quality comparison 
when $A and q* are randomly generated. 
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C. SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps had a target retention goal of 203 aviators in FY09.  A 
final count revealed that some 330 aviators had been retained, a retention rate of 
161 percent over the target.  Such an occurrence in part reflects the harsh 
economic conditions that plagued the nation during the economic downturn.  
However, the excess retention also suggests that the ACP bonus was set too 
high.  As a result, aviators who might not have retained initially were given a 
monetary incentive to do so, while aviators who would have retained for 
significantly less were paid in excess.  Auction mechanisms can determine the 
precise ACP required to meet the retention target and reduce the economic rent 
paid to those would have retained for a smaller ACP bonus than is currently 
offered. 
The power of an auction lies in its ability to invoke truthful revelation of 
reservation values.  Thus, each bid represents the value of alternative 
employment the bidders expect in the civilian labor market if their bid were to be 
rejected.  As a result, the ACP bonuses are set at the correct monetary amount, 
the amount commensurate with one’s opportunity costs in the civilian labor 
market.  If a uniform price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction were to be adapted 
during times of economic downturn, the modest cost savings and quality gains 
realized in the simulation could increase considerably as participants are faced 
with diminishing civilian labor market opportunities.  Thus, higher quality officers 
could potentially be retained for significantly smaller ACP bonuses than 
previously offered.  
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The notion of using an auction mechanism to more cost effectively assign 
some type of military incentive pay has been the subject of several studies and 
theses over the past five years.  However, this is the first known academic study 
that addresses the quality aspect of the personnel targeted for retention.  This 
thesis explores the use of an auction mechanism to more cost effectively assign 
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) while simultaneously retaining higher quality 
aviators.   
The objective of the study was to examine the benefits to the Marine 
Corps of using an auction mechanism to assign ACP.  The purpose of the 
uniform price Quality Adjusted Discount Action is to reduce total costs, while 
simultaneously retaining higher quality personnel.  The goal of this study was to 
evaluate the existing ACP system and through experimentation, coupled with 
economical analyses, determine the feasibility of replacing the current system of 
assigning the aviator retention bonus with one that incorporates the QUAD 
methodology. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions for the both the primary and secondary research 
questions explored in the study will be addressed independently.  However 
because the primary and secondary research questions are so closely 
interrelated, the recommendations for both questions can best be address 
simultaneously. 
1. Primary Research Question 
 Can a Quality Adjusted Uniform Price Auction be used 
to more cost effectively incentivize aviators while 
concurrently retaining higher quality aviators? 
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Conclusions: 
 Under the current system, ACP bonus amounts are based in 
part on the historical retention levels achieved at a given bonus amount.  This 
method does not take into consideration the range of opportunity costs, and 
accompanying reservation values, maintained by the target aviator population.  
Some officers may be willing to retain, but require higher bonus amounts to 
match outside opportunity costs.  If these officers’ reservation values are not met, 
they will be lost to the civilian labor market.  Other officers may require 
significantly lower bonus amounts to retain because of a lack of outside offers or 
because of their propensity for military service.  These officers collect a 
substantial amount of economic rent if all officers receive the same ACP amount. 
 Although the standard uniform price auction can save money 
when used to assign ACP bonuses, it lacks the ability to control for the quality of 
aviators retained.  Therefore, we introduced a new auction mechanism called the 
uniform price Quality Adjusted Discount Action, which improves the average 
quality of aviators retained in service compared to the uniform price auction. 
Furthermore, our simulations demonstrate that QUAD auction also saves cost 
about 75% of the rounds compared to the uniform priced auction. As revealed in 
the study, average aviator quality increases with total ACP costs; therefore, 
manpower planners reserve the ability to meet the reservation values of higher 
quality aviators when warranted. 
2. Secondary Research Question 
 How should changing economic conditions, and 
resulting changes in the civilian labor market, affect 
ACP bonus amounts? 
Conclusions: 
 This current method of assigning ACP does not take into 
consideration various economic conditions that may affect an aviator’s decision 
to remain on active duty.  For example, an economic recession would dictate that 
bonus amounts be lowered, while industry expansions might necessitate that 
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bonuses be increased.  An auction format would always incorporate the current 
economic conditions because aviator’s bidding strategy is a function of their 
reservation values.    
Recommendations: 
 Modify the current ACP system with an auction mechanism 
that caters to a wide range of individual reservation values resulting from various 
economic conditions.  Based on the results, the QUAD auction will give 
manpower planners the flexibility to retain higher quality aviators while potentially 
reducing the total cost of ACP.  This combination will aid the Marine Corps in its 
overall retention effort. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND STUDY 
The following recommendations for further study will advance the concept 
of using an auction mechanism for officer retention and ACP assignment: 
 Validate the QUAD mechanism through a series of economic 
experiments to verify that potential bidders would behave as auction theory 
suggests.  
 Investigate the feasibility of assigning and implementing the quality 
rating (q*) used to in this study to determine which aviators received the QUAD. 
 Explore the practicability of promoting and retaining officers in the 
aviation community as a restricted MOS.  This would reduce manpower 
surpluses and ensure that the aviators being retained are the same aviators 
being promoted.   
 Conduct further research regarding reasons other than money that 
aviators retain.  Informal interviews with marine aviators during the course of this 
study reveal that money is not the deciding factor behind their decision to remain 
on active duty.  This indicates the need the explore alternatives retention tools. 
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APPENDIX.  DETAILED EXPLANATION OF AUCTION THEORY 
The following is an excerpt from a thesis written by Tony K. Verenna while 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School. 
TYPES OF AUCTIONS  
 
1. Ascending-bid (English Auction)  
 This type of auction is the most common.  It involves bidders raising the 
price until only one buyer is left.  This auction can be run three ways:  1. the 
seller announces prices, 2. the bidders call out their prices, or 3. bids can be 
submitted electronically with the best current price listed (Klemperer, 2004).    
 
2. Descending-bid (Dutch Auction)  
 This type of auction is exactly the opposite of the ascending-bid auction.  In 
this scenario, the price starts out higher than any buyer is willing to pay and 
lowers continuously until the first bidder is willing to accept the good at the 
current price (Klemperer, 2004).    
  
3. First-price Sealed Bid  
 This type of auction consists of each bidder submitting their bid without the 
knowledge of the other bidders.  In this scenario, the good goes to the bidder 
who has submitted the highest bid and the winner pays the price they bid 
(Klemperer, 2004).    
 
4. Second-price Sealed Bid  
 This type is very similar to the first-price sealed bid auctions.  In this 
scenario, the winner is still the bidder who has submitted the highest bid; 
however, the bidder only has to pay the price of the second highest (or first 
excluded) bid (Klemperer, 2004).    
 
KEY FEATURES  
 
1. Forward Versus Reverse  
 
a.  Forward Auction  
 A Forward Auction is the most common form of auctioning and one that is 
most familiar.  It involves a single seller of a good and multiple buyers bidding for 
the right to purchase that good.  Usually the winner of this type of auction is the 
bidder who submits the highest bid.  
 
b.  Reverse Auction  
 A reverse auction consists of one buyer and multiple sellers vying for a 
specific good.  In a reverse auction, the winner is the bidder with the lowest bid.  
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2. First-price Versus Second-price Bidding Strategies  
 
a.  First-price  
 In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays what he bid for the item; in a 
reverse auction the bidder gets paid what he bid.  In the forward auction, if the 
bidder wins the auction that is below his private-value, then he receives a profit.  
In a reverse auction, the bidder who wins the auction above his reserve price 
receives a surplus.  Bidders can use information or “signals” to determine the 
amount they are going to bid to maximize their profit or surplus.  Bidders will 
under bid their true valuation in a forward auction and they will bid above their 
true valuation in a reverse auction.  
  
b.  Second-price  
 In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays an amount equal to the 
second highest bid.  In a reverse auction, the winner is paid an amount equal to 
the first non-winning bid.  In each case, one’s bid is only used to determine if he 
is the winner.  The amount the bidder pays or gets paid depends on the bids of 
others.  In both types of auctions, the dominant strategy is for each bidder to 
submit a bid equal to their true valuation of the item.    
 
3. Common Value Versus Independent Private-Value  
 
a.  Common Value  
 The value of the item is common or the same for each bidder; however, 
bidders have different private information about what the value actually is.  For 
example, the value of land that supposedly has oil underground will have the 
same value to any buyer who plans to drill the oil.  Bidders may have access to 
different “signals” about the amount of oil located underground, so they may have 
different perceptions about its common value.  In this case, bidders might change 
their estimate if they learned of another bidder’s signal.  
 
b.  Independent Private-Value  
 The value of the item is whatever the individual bidder values the item to be.  
This information is private to the bidder.  This does not preclude bidders from 
changing their bid to gain an advantage once they find out the bids of others.  An 
example of this would encompass a contractor bidding on a job.  The contractor 
knows what the job will likely cost him; however, he does not know what it will 
cost other contractors.   
 
4. Open Versus Sealed-bid  
 
a.  Open Auctions  
 An open auction consists of the bidders knowing the competitions’ bids.  
Bids can be called out by an auctioneer, the bidders can call out their bids, or a 
bid can be posted electronically.  The key to an open auction is that bidders know 
what others are bidding.  
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b.  Sealed-bid  
 In a sealed-bid auction, the bidder only knows his bid.  All bids are 
submitted somewhat simultaneously as each bidder submits one bid.  In this 
case, the bidders must estimate what other bidders may bid to maximize their 
chances of winning.  
  
FACTORS WHEN DECIDNG AUCTION FORMAT  
  
 Several factors need to be considered when deciding on the type of auction 
to be used.  The objectives may differ for each seller in different auctions.  
According to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), the design of the auction 
does not matter as each type generally yields the same revenue for the seller.  
The following factors should be considered when designing an auction:  
 
1. Revenue Equivalence  
 According to the RET, all four types of auctions yield the same revenue on 
average under the following assumptions:  
 -  Bidders are risk neutral  
 -  Independent private-values assumption applies  
 -  Symmetric bidders (each draws from similar probability distributions)  
 -  Payment is based only on bids  
 If these four criteria are met, it does not matter which design is chosen and 
the expected value for each auction will be generally the same.  For example, the 
English and second-price sealed-bid auctions will yield the same revenue as the 
winner pays the second highest value.  In the Dutch and first-priced sealed-bid 
auctions, the winner will attempt to outbid his competition by the slightest value to 
maximize his economic rent.  By meeting the four criteria described above, the 
RET would prove to be correct.  However, most auctions will fail to meet the 
criteria of the RET and bidders tend to act differently within each design.  
Klemperer raises the issue of collusion and the attractiveness to potential bidders 
as reason for susceptibility.  An auction designer needs to understand the 
purpose of the auction to design it correctly.    
 
2. Risk Tolerance Among Bidders 
 Information is a key aspect in all forms of auctions.  In the open form 
auctions, bidders can view their competitors’ bids; whereas, in sealed bid 
auctions, the bidder is dependant on the information he has gathered to submit a 
bid based on his value.  The amount of information or lack of information creates 
uncertainty and risk.    
 Generally, a risk neutral bidder’s behavior is not affected by an increase in 
risk, and, therefore, such a bidder will approach all types of auctions in the same 
manner.  On the other hand, most individuals are risk averse and will attempt to 
decrease their risk and increase their certainty.  A risk averse person will tend to 
bid more aggressively to increase the probability of winning and reduce the 
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uncertainty.  This also would decrease the surplus value received from the 
product if a risk-averse individual is the winning bidder.  Risk averse bidders will 
typically generate higher values for the sellers in the Dutch and first-price sealed 
bid auctions compared to the English and second-price sealed bid auctions.    
 
3. Collusion  
 Individual bidders would like to collude in auctions to keep prices at a 
minimum.  In open auctions, collusion could occur through signals among 
bidders or through the bid itself, especially if the product is of value to the bidder.  
In addition, a bidder who is not cooperating with a colluder could be forced into 
paying a much higher price for an item than if the bidder had cooperated.  In 
sealed-bid auctions, collusion is very rare as there is no communication between 
the players in the bidding process; collusion requires pre-agreement concerning 
the sealed bids.  A seller would obviously attempt to thwart collusion, using one 
of the following options.  First, the seller can set a reserve price (see below).  
Second, if the seller becomes aware that collusion is occurring, the item being 
auctioned can be removed and saved for another day.  Third, an auctioneer 
could remove suspected colluders from the auction.  Finally, an auctioneer could 
revert to unethical practices and utilize a ghost bidder to raise the price of an 
auction.  
 
4. Reserve Price  
 For a seller to guarantee an appropriate profit, he may set a reserve price.  
This is a minimum price (forward auction) or maximum price (reverse auction) set 
at the outset to guarantee minimum revenue or maximum cost.  These prices 
must be set carefully so they don’t discourage potential bidders from bidding.  
For example, in a forward auction a seller could set a reserve price of $500 for an 
item when a bidder values that item to be $400.  As a result, this potential bidder 
would not participate in this auction.  If this reserve price scares off all potential 
bidders, the seller would lose his sale even though he could have potentially 
received his value through the auction.    
  
 Setting reserve prices could also deter collusion.  If the seller sets his price 
to receive a profit, he will get bids assuming the price is not too high.  It would not 
matter if colluders minimized the value or the bids; the seller would still receive 
some profits.  Overall, setting a reserve price would reduce the incentive for 
bidders to cooperate.  
 
5. Private Information  
 As stated previously, information is a key aspect to an auction.  Information 
would include knowledge of the product or service, quantity available, historical 
sales, or competition involved.  The value of an item to an individual could differ 
depending on how much he knows about that item.  Auctioneers tend to provide 
information that would increase the bids to increase revenue.  On the other hand,  
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certain information may cause bidders to revise their bids downward.  An 
auctioneer or seller must decide what and how much information to divulge to the 
bidder.    
 
 Information can also increase uncertainty.  If a seller releases certain 
information that may cause a bidder to increase his value of an item, then the risk 
averse bidder would increase his bid to increase his probability of winning the 
item.    
 
6. Number of Bidders  
 An increase in competition or the number of bidders usually increases the 
seller’s revenue.  In this case, it would be to the seller’s benefit to increase 
participation in an auction.  This could also serve the purpose of a reserve price. 
In Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions, more bidders tend to generate higher 
bids for an item as increased competition (uncertainty) and risk aversion cause 
participants to alter their bids; whereas increased competition in an English or 
second-price sealed bid auction would not change the bidding strategy, as the 
bidder only bids his value of an item regardless of the competition (however, the 
highest and second highest valued bids are likely to increase with increased 
participation).    
 
7. Other Factors  
 Auction design can be influenced by other factors.  These include: entry 
fees to participate in an auction, time limits instilled for the auction, and a 
middleman representing the bidder.  
 
 Entry fees could be charged to participate in an auction.  This could 
separate those undesirable bidders from the more serious bidders.  In addition, 
an entry fee resembles a reserve price, as those with low valuations of an item 
would be excluded.  One drawback to an entry fee, especially in an assignment 
or bonus setting, would be that individual bidders would tire of submitting bids if it 
becomes non-refundable and the guarantee of return dwindles.  
 
 Time limits would control the amount of information that individual bidders 
could collect on other bidders to determine their value of an item or a 
competitor’s bidding strategy.  Time limits would also increase uncertainty.  As 
stated previously, a risk averse participant would bid more aggressively to 
decrease uncertainty.  A tight time limit imposed on an assignment or bonus 
auction for the military would not necessarily be suitable.  Military personnel are 
dispersed throughout the world and information on auctions and ways to submit 
bids may not always be available in a timely manner.  
 
 The last factor to consider is that of the middleman.  A middleman could 
represent the bidder.  To do this, the middleman must know the bidder’s 
valuation and must definitely know the bidder’s maximum bid in a forward auction 
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and the minimum bid in a reverse auction.  Also, it would be in the best interest of 
both the seller and the bidder for the middleman to know some information about 
the item up for bid.  A positive aspect of the middleman includes the fact that 
military personnel could still participate in an auction no matter what their 
geographical or technological status, assuming they understand the previous 
issues.     
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